The Real Story
On A Plane, And Why They Got There 
Thu Feb 14, 2008 at 05:17:46 AM PST
|
|
|
A B-52H bomber with a full load of 12 Advanced Cruise Missiles under the wings.
|
Anyone remember the "oh, shit!" nuclear weapons episode of 2007? Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists (and their Nuclear Information Project) blogged it:
Michael Hoffman reports in Military Times that five (some say six) nuclear-armed Advanced Cruise Missiles were mistakenly flown on a B-52H bomber from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana on August 30.
I disclosed in March that the Air Force had decided to retire the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), and the Minot incident apparently was part of the dismantlement process of the weapon system.
The post is very thorough, and I highly recommend reading it. He goes into detail, explaining how the DoE and DoD keep track of our nuclear weapons, a brief history of how they have been transported via aircraft (including some "incidents"), and how the transfer from Minot Air Force Base was part of decreasing our cruise missile stockpile.
Last month, the Washington Post reported on subsequent changes the Air Force has made in how they handle nuclear weapon transport:
A key change is a firm prohibition against storing nuclear armed and nonnuclear armed weapons in the same storage facility, a contributing factor in the Aug. 29 mix-up. A crew at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., using outdated information, picked up six missiles with dummy warheads and six carrying nuclear warheads from the same storage hangar. The missiles eventually were loaded on a B-52 and flown to Louisiana, where the missiles were to be decommissioned.
"Do not co-mingle nuclear and non-nuclear munitions/missiles . . . in the same storage structure, cell or WS3," the new instructions state. (A WS3 is an underground vault.) The instructions were first disclosed by Stephen Aftergood on his Secrecy News Web site.
[Click here for Aftergood's post.]
Sounds like a fantastic idea. Too bad they didn't think of it sooner...
... which leads us to what you'll find on page A02 of today's Washington Post. The news is not good:
The Defense Department is displaying a "precipitous decrease in attention" to the security and control of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, according to a Defense Science Board task force that examined the broader causes behind the U.S. flight in August of a B-52 bomber that inadvertently carried six cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads.
"The decline in DoD focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable,"
the task force said in a report released yesterday by its chairman, retired Air Force Gen. Larry D. Welch, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.
Welch, who served in the 1980s as head of the Strategic Air Command and later as Air Force chief of staff, told the senators about his concern that "the nation and its leadership do not value the nuclear mission and the people who perform that mission."
I've always said that the last person (next to John McCain) who needs to have thousands and thousands of nukes (on hair-trigger status, mind you) under his control is George W. Bush.
More from the article:
The Welch panel pointed out that Air Force colonels, Navy captains and mid-level civilians are now responsible for managing the Pentagon's nuclear programs -- a task that during the Cold War was handled by senior flag officers or senior civilians. One of the panel's recommendations is the appointment of an assistant secretary of defense for nuclear enterprise reporting directly to the defense secretary, as well as the naming of flag officers in each of the services who would focus solely on nuclear weapons.
The task force's findings were reflected in a statement made before the committee by three senior Air Force officers who had supervised two other inquiries after the B-52 flight. They said the Air Force's once-central focus on its nuclear mission "has diminished since 1991," after the end of the Cold War. At the same time, they said, "the Air Force began 17 years of continuous combat including conventional air power commitments" using aircraft, such as B-52s, once reserved for nuclear operations.
[Click here (pdf) for the report, "Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety Report: Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons".]
Although it is expected that the Air Force would shift some of its focus from our nuclear mission after the Cold War ended, one would certainly hope that the emphasis on the safety and security of the arsenal would not diminish, especially since we have less nukes than we used to. The key is in Ret. General Welch's quote above, which bears repeating:
"the nation and its leadership do not value the nuclear mission and the people who perform that mission."
They just value a different mission. A George W. Bush-style mission:
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and White House guidance issued in response to the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001 led to the creation of new nuclear strike options against regional states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, according to a military planning document obtained by the Federation of American Scientists.
As Meteor Blades pointed out last November, Syria and Iran are on this new nuclear "hit list".
I'm sure John McCain loves the sound of that.
It’s naive to say that we will never use nuclear weapons.
-- John McCain, August 5, 2007, Republican Presidential Debate
Congressional Review
By David Morgan, Feb 12, 2008 1:13 PM ET
WASHINGTON--The Air Force mistakenly flew nuclear weapons across the United States last year as a result of eroding discipline spawned by a diminished strategic focus on nuclear weapons, officials said on Tuesday.
A panel of Air Force and independent investigators told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the increased importance of conventional combat missions since the 1991 Gulf War has undermined nuclear-related training and experience.
"The turning point of this diminished focus began when aircraft came off nuclear alert status," three Air Force officers headed by deputy Air Force chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Daniel Darnell, said in a written report to the panel.
"Training in nuclear procedures became less frequent without the daily activity required by nuclear alert conditions coupled with the expanded commitments of dual-tasked units," they said.
In one of the U.S. military's worst nuclear mix-ups, six nuclear missiles were mistakenly loaded on an Air Force B-52 and flown 1,400 miles from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.
"No one knew where they were, or even missed them, for over 36 hours," Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee's Democratic chairman, said at a public hearing on Air Force nuclear security.
The Air Force says the warheads were not armed and were never in danger of detonating. But Levin disputed assertions by the Air Force and his Republican colleagues that the weapons posed no danger to the public, saying a crash could have caused a plutonium leak like one that occurred during a B-52 crash in Spain in the 1960s.
"This is a very significant failure, the likes of which we don't think ever occurred before and hopefully will never occur again."
As a result of the mix-up, four Air Force officers -- three colonels and a lieutenant colonel -- were removed from their posts while 65 other Air Force members lost permission to handle nuclear weapons.
Three official investigations showed problems at both bases, saying well-established nuclear checks and balances were either ignored or disregarded.
Darnell assured the Senate panel that Air Force policies are sound and the nuclear mission strong. But he said the military service is implementing more than 120 improvements recommended by investigators.
But retired Gen. Larry Welch, an independent investigator with the Institute for Defense Analyses, told lawmakers that the Air Force nuclear mission faces a status problem caused by the end of the Cold War arms race against the Soviet Union.
He reported a "perception at all levels within the nuclear enterprise that the nation and its leadership do not value the nuclear mission and the people who perform that mission."
Original Story
Was Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons Foiled by Military Leak?
Source: The Canadian
|
Who ordered the loading of Advanced Cruise missiles on to a B-52 in violation of Air Force regulations? The quick reaction of the Air Force and the issuing of a public statement describing the seriousness of the issue and the launch of an immediate investigation, suggests that whatever occurred was outside the regular chain of military command. If the regular chain of command was violated, then we have to inquire as to whether the B-52 incident was part of a covert project whose classification level exceeded that held by officers in charge of nuclear weapons at Minot AFB.
|
http://www.agoracosmopolitan.com/home/Frontpage/2007/09/07/01751.html
Michael E. Salla, M.A., Ph.D.
Critically exploring whether or not there was a covert attempt to instigate a catastrophic nuclear war against Iran is illuminated through an introduction using the recent B-52 incident. On Aug. 30, 2007, a B-52 bomber armed with five nuclear-tipped Advanced Cruise missiles flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, LA. Each missile had an adjustable yield between five and 150 kilotons of TNT, which is at the lower end of the destructive capacities of U.S. nuclear weapons. For example, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima had a yield of 13 kilotons, while the Bravo hydrogen bomb test of 1954 had a yield of 15,000 kilotons. The B-52 story was first covered in the Army Times on Sept.5, 2007 after the nuclear armed aircraft was discovered by airmen.
What made this a very significant event was that it was a violation of U.S. Air Force regulations concerning the transportation of nuclear weapons by air. Nuclear weapons are normally transported by air in specially constructed planes designed to prevent radioactive pollution in case of a crash. Such transport planes are not equipped to launch the nuclear weapons they routinely carry around the U.S. and the world for servicing or positioning.
The discovery of the nuclear-armed B-52 was, according to Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert at the Federation of American Scientists, the first time in 40 years that a nuclear armed plane had been allowed to fly in the U.S. LINK. Since 1968, after a SAC bomber crashed in Greenland, all nuclear armed aircraft have been grounded but were kept on a constant state of alert. After the end of the Cold War, President George H. Bush ordered in 1991 that nuclear weapons were to be removed from all aircraft and stored in nearby facilities.
Recently, the Air Force began decommissioning its stockpile of Advanced Cruise missiles. The five nuclear weapons on the B-52 were to be decommissioned, and were to be taken to another Air Force base. An Air Force press statement issued Sept. 6, 2007, claimed that there "was an error which occurred during a regularly scheduled transfer of weapons between two bases."
Furthermore, the statement declared: "The Air Force maintains the highest standards of safety and precision so any deviation from these well established munitions procedures is considered very serious." The issue concerning how a nuclear armed B-52 bomber was allowed to take off and fly in U.S. air space after an 'error' in a routine transfer process, is now subject to an official Air Force inquiry which is due to be completed by Sept. 14, 2008.
Three key questions emerge over the B-52 incident.
First, did Air Force personnel at Minot AFB not spot the 'error' earlier given the elaborate security procedures in place to prevent such mistakes from occurring?
Many military analysts have commented on the stringent security procedures in place to prevent this sort of mistake. Multiple officers are routinely involved in the transportation and loading of nuclear weapons to prevent the kind of 'error' that allegedly occurred in the B-52 incident.
According to the U.S. Air Force statement, the commanding officer in charge of military munitions personnel and additional munitions airmen were relieved of duties pending the completion of the investigation. According to Kristensen, the error could not have come from confusing the Advanced Cruise Missile with a conventional weapons since no conventional form exists. So the munitions airmen should have been easily able to spot the mistake. Other routine procedures were violated, which suggests a rather obvious explanation for the error. The military munitions personnel were acting under direct orders, though not through the regular chain of military command. This takes me to the second question
Second, who was in charge of the B-52 incident?
Who ordered the loading of Advanced Cruise missiles onto a B-52 in violation of Air Force regulations? The quick reaction of the Air Force, and the issuing of a public statement describing the seriousness of the issue and the launch of an immediate investigation, suggests that whatever occurred, was outside the regular chain of military command. If the regular chain of command was violated, then we have to inquire as to whether the B-52 incident was part of a covert project whose classification level exceeded that held by officers in charge of nuclear weapons at Minot AFB.
The most obvious governmental entity that may have ordered the nuclear arming of the B-52 outside the regular chain of military command is the last remaining bastion of neo-conservative activism in the Bush administration.
Vice President Cheney has taken a very prominent role in covert military operations and training exercises designed for the "seamless integration" of different national security and military authorities to possible terrorist attacks. On May 8, 2001, President Bush placed Mr. Cheney in charge of "[A]ll federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction, consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies". LINK. Mr. Cheney subsequently played a direct role in supervising training exercises that simultaneously occurred during the 9/11 attacks.
According to former Los Angeles Police Officer Michael Ruppert, Mr. Cheney had a parallel chain of command that he used to override Air Force objections to stand down orders that grounded the USAF during the 9/11 attacks.
Ruppert learned that the Secret Service had the authority to directly communicate presidential and vice presidential orders to fighter pilots in the air, thereby circumventing the normal chain of command. (Crossing the Rubicon, pp. 428 - 429). Furthermore: "It is the Secret Service who has the legal mandate to take supreme command in case of a scheduled major event - or an unplanned major emergency - on American soil; these are designated "National Special Security Events."
Ruppert and others have subsequently claimed that 9/11 was an "inside job;" and alleges Cheney, through the Secret Service, played a direct leadership role in what occurred over 9/11. Consequently, it is very possible that Cheney could have played a similar role in circumventing the regular chain of military command in ordering the B-52 incident. The B-52 incident could be part of a contrived "National Special Security Event" directly controlled by Cheney by virtue of the alleged authority granted to him by President Bush, and through the Secret Service, which at least theoretically, has the technological means to bypass the regular chain of military command. I now move to my third key question.
Third, why was the nuclear-armed B-52 sent to Barksdale AFB?
If initial reports that the weapons were being decommissioned, but were mistakenly transported by a B-52 bomber, then the weapons should have been taken to Kirtland Air Force Base. According to Kristensen, this is "where the warheads are separated from the rest of the weapon and shipped to the Energy Department's Pantex dismantlement facility near Amarillo, Texas".
However, it has been revealed that Barksdale AFB is used as a staging base for operations in the Middle East.This is circumstantial evidence that the weapons were being deployed for possible use in the Middle East.
There has been recent speculation concerning a possible attack against Iran, given reports that the Pentagon has completed plans for a three- day bombing blitz, according to a Sunday Times report, LINK. The report claims that 1,200 targets have been selected and this will destroy much of Iran's military infrastructure. Such an attack will devastate Iran's economy, create greater political instability in the region, and stop the oil supply. A disruption of the oil supply from the Persian Gulf could trigger a global economic recession and lead to the collapse of financial markets.
In a rather disturbing synchronistic development, there have been reports of billion-dollar investments in high-risk stock options in both Europe and the U.S. that would only be profitable if a dramatic collapse of the stock market were to occur before Sept. 21. Similar stock options were purchased weeks before the 9/11 attack in 2001, and investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission for possible insider trading. The combination of the Sunday Times report and the stock market option purchases is circumstantial evidence that plans for a concerted military attack against Iran have been secretly approved and covert operations have begun.
Seymour Hersh in May 2006 reported the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the use of nuclear weapons against Iran.
In late April, the military leadership, headed by General Pace, achieved a major victory when the White House dropped its insistence that the plan for a bombing campaign include the possible use of a nuclear device to destroy Iran's uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz, nearly 200 miles south of Tehran. .. "Bush and Cheney were dead serious about the nuclear planning," the former senior intelligence official told me. "And Pace stood up to them.
Then the world came back: 'O.K., the nuclear option is politically unacceptable.'
Given earlier opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is likely that the present attack plans for Iraq drawn up by the Pentagon don't involve the use of nuclear weapons. In order to circumvent the regular chain of command, opposed to a nuclear attack, it is very likely that Vice President Cheney contrived a "National Special Security Event" that involved a nuclear-armed B-52. This would have given him the legal authority to place orders directly through the Secret Service to the Air Force officers responsible for the B-52 incident.
Conclusion: Exposing Those Responsible for the B-52 Incident
Consequently, there is considerable circumstantial evidence to argue that the nuclear-armed B-52 was part of an apparent covert operation, outside the regular chain of constitutional military command. The alleged authority responsible for this was Vice President Cheney. He very likely used the Secret Service to take charge of a contrived National Special Security Event involving a nuclear-armed B-52 that would be flown from Minot AFB. The B-52 was directed to Barksdale AFB where it would have conducted a covert mission to the Middle East involving the detonation of one or more nuclear weapons most likely in or near Iran. This could either have occurred during a conventional military strike against Iran, or a False Flag operation in the Persian Gulf region.
Apparently, the leaking and discovery of the nuclear-armed B-52 at Barksdale was not part of the script. According to a confidential source of Larry Johnson, a former counter-terrorism official from the State Department and CIA, the discovery of the nuclear-armed B-52 was leaked. Johnson concludes: "Did someone at Barksdale try to indirectly warn the American people that the Bush Administration is staging nukes for Iran? I don't know, but it is a question worth asking."
While the general public is likely to be given a watered-down declassified report by the Air Force over the B-52 incident on Sept.14, the real investigation will reveal that it was part of a covert operation that intended to bypass the regular chain of command in using nuclear weapons in the Middle East. This will likely result in a furious backlash by key figures in the regular military chain of command such as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and the Commander of Central Command, Admiral William Fallon, who have direct responsibility for the conduct of military operations in the Middle East. The U. S. Air Force, the Secretary of Defense and Commander of Central Command, are now aware of what was likely going to be the true use of the B-52 and the responsibility of the Office of the Vice President.
It is very likely that the exposure of the B-52 incident will lead to an indefinite hold on plans to attack Iran, given uncertainty whether other nuclear weapons have been covertly positioned for use in the Middle East. Significantly, public officials briefed about the true circumstances of the B-52 incident will almost certainly place enormous pressure on Vice President Cheney to immediately resign if it is found that he played the role identified above. It is therefore anticipated that, in a very short time, the public will learn that Cheney has resigned for health reasons.
The forthcoming Sept. 14 U.S. Air Force report will likely describe the B-52 incident as an "error" and an "isolated incident" as foreshadowed in the Sept. 6, 2007 press statement. This will create some difficulty in exposing the actual role played by Cheney and any other government figures that supported him. There will be a need for continued public awareness of the true events behind the B-52 incident in order to expose the actual role of Cheney. Only in that way can Cheney be held accountable for his actions, and other government figures that supported his neo-conservative agenda be exposed.
Regardless of whether Cheney's role as the prime architect of the B-52 incident is exposed to the public, the official backlash against his covert operation should force his resignation. In either case, a very dangerous public official would be removed from a powerful position of influence. More importantly, the world has been spared a devastating nuclear war by courageous American airmen who revealed the true contents of an otherwise routine B-52 landing at Barksdale AFB headed for a covert nuclear mission to the Middle East.
About the author:
Michael E. Salla, M.A. Ph.D., is a former Assistant Professor in the School of International Service, American University, Washington D.C. He is the author of five books and founder of the Exopolitics Institute, a 501(c)3 non-profit organization based in Kona, Hawaii.
Further Reading
Michael Kane, "Simplifying the case against Dick Cheney,"
Larry Johnson, "Staging Nukes for Iran?",
Michael Hoffman, "B-52 mistakenly flies with nukes aboard,"
Michael Salla, Ph.D. "Will the U.S. Attack Iran Before Sept. 21? - Are CIA Front Companies Investing $4.5 Billion to Profit from attacking Iran?",
Edward Thomas, Lt. Col., "U.S. Air Force Statement on B-52 Nuclear Incident at Minot," PDF
Michael Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon (New Society Publishers, 2004).
Comments (0)
You don't have permission to comment on this page.