| 
  • If you are citizen of an European Union member nation, you may not use this service unless you are at least 16 years old.

  • You already know Dokkio is an AI-powered assistant to organize & manage your digital files & messages. Very soon, Dokkio will support Outlook as well as One Drive. Check it out today!

View
 

Peak Oil - Latest News

Page history last edited by PBworks 15 years, 6 months ago

Peak Oil Update Oct 2008 

Oil Bubble - George Soros May 26, 2008

Oil And The Fed 

WSJ - IEA Warns Oil Crunch Coming May 22 2008

Oil Futures 04-17-2008

Impact Of War with Iran on Oil Prices-production

Oil Nears $100 

Nov 7, 2007

Peak Oil Crisis

25 October 2007

 

 

Peak Oil and War! 

 

After Oil Supplies Dry Up, What’s Plan B?

by Erica Etelson
 

When Hurricane Katrina struck two years ago, Americans learned just how ill-equipped the government is to respond effectively to natural disasters. But if you think the government’s response to Katrina was inept, brace yourself for peak oil.

 

Global oil production will hit its peak in the next few years, at which point oil prices will skyrocket and voracious consumers like the United States, China and Europe will quickly drain every last barrel they can afford to buy. Our per-capita oil consumption is double that of most European nations and more than triple Mexico’s, and shows no sign of slowing. As supplies dwindle, an economic disaster on a par with Katrina will start to unfold.

 

Global oil demand is at 84 million barrels a day and rising, and there are at most a trillion barrels’ worth still in the ground, most of which is very difficult and expensive to recover. Do the math, and you’ll see that the end of oil is, at most, 30 years away.

 

But long before oil actually runs out, economists and energy analysts warn that extreme scarcity will cause prices to soar so high that it will no longer be feasible to use petroleum on a wide scale. It is the imminence of this supply-demand shortfall that has people like National Petroleum Council member Matthew Simmons and Reps. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., and Tom Udall, D-N.M., worried - very worried - about our economy’s ability to withstand the end of oil.

 

Cheap and plentiful oil is the foundation of our economy. Everything from food production and distribution to the manufacture of clothing, footwear, medications and plastic goods relies heavily on petroleum. You name it, and we need oil to produce it, ship it and, in many cases, run it.

 

In February, the U.S. Government Accountability Office dropped a quiet little bombshell: a report on peak oil concluding that there is an urgent need for a swift, coordinated government strategy to assess and develop alternative energy technologies to avert “severe economic damage.”

 

The agency concluded: “(T)he United States, as the largest consumer of oil and one of the nations most heavily dependent on oil for transportation, may be especially vulnerable among the industrialized nations of the world.” Stark though its conclusion is, the GAO may in fact be understating the gravity of the situation.

 

The report followed on the heels of a 2005 peak oil risk management report commissioned by the Department of Energy, which warned of the “extremely damaging” and “chaotic” impacts that will ensue if “intensive,” “aggressive” and “expensive” mitigation measures are not put in place at least 10 years ahead of time. Both reports landed with a dull thud and have been dutifully ignored. In other words, there is no Plan B.

 

Depending on whom you ask, the impacts of peak oil range from dire to catastrophic: At best, get ready for a crippling recession and widespread inflation. At worst, we face severe global food shortages that threaten wide-scale starvation and an overall breakdown of social and economic institutions. And if history is any guide, we can expect a series of military invasions into every remaining oil hot spot in the world - invasions that may, by the way, require even more fossil fuels than we could possibly expropriate by force.

 

Because oil companies and OPEC nations are notorious for overstating their reserves to manipulate the market, it is impossible to predict when exactly the world will start feeling the crunch. As award-winning New York Times reporter Peter Maas wrote in 2005, “Because we do not know when a supply-demand shortfall might arrive, we do not know when to begin preparing for it, so as to soften its impact; the economic blow may come as a sledgehammer from the darkness.”

 

But here’s a little hint: Crude oil futures hit an all-time high of $78.21 per barrel on July 31. Prices cannot go much higher without us beginning to feel the foreshocks of a peak oil catastrophe. Oh, and by the way, natural gas (which provides 42 percent of California’s power) is running out, too. One day, even coal will be gone. How much longer are we going to wait before we figure out how to survive without fossil fuels?

 

The United States has reacted to the threat of peak oil and gas with all the alacrity of its response to climate change. It is ignoring the looming crisis for as long as it can, just waiting for that sledgehammer to land its first blow. Eventually, when a recession hits, tax revenue will plummet, and the government will have nowhere near the money it needs to build an alternative energy and transportation infrastructure. Every year that goes by without an intensive mobilization to build an oil-independent economy diminishes our odds of surviving the end of oil.

States, too, seem to have their heads in the sand. California, considered a leader in efforts to reduce carbon emissions, just cut funding for mass transit by $1.3 billion for the fiscal year. Like most states, it ignores the urgent need to build a transportation network that does not rely on fossil fuels.

 

At this point, you might be asking yourself: When oil becomes scarce, how will I get food? That’s a very good question. Here are a few more: Will my garbage get picked up? How will my water district purify and deliver water and treat sewage without petrochemicals? What if I need an ambulance? What if my home is one of the 7.7 million that rely on oil for heating? Which of my medications are made out of petrochemicals? How will I get to work? Will I even have a job anymore?

 

But don’t just ask yourself. Ask your elected officials, your public utility district and your grocer. Ask the U.S. Postal Service, Federal Express and American Airlines. Ask GM. If you have one, ask your financial adviser or stockbroker which companies will still be in business after peak oil hits. Odds are, he or she will give you a blank stare.

 

While the United States blindly carries on with business as usual, countries such as Sweden, Iceland and Ireland are taking steps to assess and mitigate peak oil impacts. Oil-rich Iran has begun rationing and has already cut oil consumption by 25 percent. But here at home, demand for oil is ever on the rise, and there is no talk of conserving reserves for essential goods and services or to develop an alternative energy infrastructure.

 

Instead, we are on course to squander every last drop on long solo commutes, leisure travel, mountains of plastic junk and the senseless transglobal shipment of unsustainably grown food.

That’s where local government comes in. Small but growing numbers of municipalities are initiating a process that federal and state leaders should have begun 30 years ago, when domestic oil reserves peaked. They are, in short, figuring out Plan B.

 

In May, Oakland appointed an Oil Independent Oakland by 2020 Task Force. In June 2006, Portland, Ore., formed its own Peak Oil Task Force, which got busy fast: By March of this year, it had released its first major report, urging the city to “act big, act now,” even without further study or analysis. The report prompted the city to pass a resolution to accelerate oil and gas conservation measures to halve Portland’s fossil fuel consumption.

 

Last year, San Francisco passed a resolution to assess the city’s vulnerability to oil depletion and to develop a transition plan. Other cities, from Austin, Texas, to Bloomington, Ind., are confronting the stark reality and trying their best to figure out how to soften the blow.

 

Cities are looking at options such as local food cultivation, urban redesign to minimize transportation needs, locally controlled electricity, rainwater catchment systems (to ensure local access to water for food cultivation), energy-efficient mass transit, and the preparation of emergency plans for sudden and severe food, water and energy shortages. They are embracing bio-regional sustainability - a concept once dismissed as an ecotopian fantasy that is suddenly starting to look like our last best hope.

 

But cities cannot solve the peak oil problem on their own. They don’t have the revenue needed to build light-rail networks and wind farms or to store massive grain reserves. During a recession, they will be in no position to guarantee income supports for millions of laid-off workers. But the more they do now, while they still have a revenue stream, the better off their residents will be.

If the peak oil doomsday scenarios are to be averted, it will require coordinated action at every level of government, by every sector of the economy and by every community and citizen in the nation. We are heading into a political era in which the need to come together to invent and support life-sustaining social and economic systems will trump all else.

 

Some tout alternative energy technologies as the silver bullet that will save us from a peak oil crisis. But there is a broad consensus among energy analysts that it will be decades before such alternatives are available for wide-scale implementation. Moreover, some of the alternatives with the strongest political backing, including ethanol and liquefied coal, may cause even more severe global warming than petroleum has.

 

The United States needs to slam the brakes on fossil fuel consumption. As if arresting climate change weren’t enough of a reason for immediate and strong conservation measures, the end of oil may just force upon Americans a reality we have ignored for far too long: We cannot go on like this, pedal to the metal, asleep at the wheel.

 

Erica Etelson is a Berkeley journalist, former environmental attorney and oil independence activist. Contact her at oilindependence@yahoo.com.

© 2007 The San Francisco Chronicle

 

Friday, July 20th, 2007

 

Peak Oil By Any Other Name

By Chris Nelder

 

 

With apologies to William Shakespeare:

What's in a name? That which we call a peak

By any other name would hurt as much.

 

This week, the National Petroleum Council (NPC) finally coughed up a report that we've been awaiting for two years, ever since U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman asked them to determine "what the future holds for global oil and gas supply" and whether "incremental supplies can be brought on-line, on-time and at a reasonable price that does not jeopardize economic growth."

 

Translation: the Energy Secretary was wise to peak oil, and asked the oil industry to tell him where we really stand. After all, if it goes down on his watch, he's going to have one of the worst jobs on earth.

 

If he has any idea at all what the truth about global oil supply really is at this point, then I think he'll be as disappointed in the result as the rest of us "walking worried" are.

 

The report was titled "Facing the Hard Truths about Energy," but it could just as easily have been called "Dodging the Hard Truths about Energy."

ASPO's Randy Udall hit the nail on the head: "Charging the NPC with analyzing oil and gas is akin to asking the tobacco industry to forecast lung cancer."

 

The comparison is fair. The NPC report was chaired by Lee Raymond, former ExxonMobil CEO, and included over 350 participants, primarily from the energy industry, including such luminaries as the media's favorite wild-eyed optimist, Daniel Yergin of Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA). We should expect nothing less than a positive spin on the energy business from the likes of these fine gentlemen.

 

The 422-page report claimed to be "a comprehensive study considering the future of oil and natural gas to 2030 in the context of the global energy system" and in fact, contained some good work. It's worth a read and available on their Web site. And in all fairness, it did concede a couple of key points:

 

  • "It is a hard truth that the global supply of oil and natural gas from the conventional sources relied upon historically is unlikely to meet projected 50% to 60% growth in demand over the next 25 years."
  • "The concept of energy independence is not realistic in the foreseeable future, whereas U.S. energy security can be enhanced by moderating demand, expanding and diversifying domestic energy supplies, and strengthening global energy trade and investment. There can be no U.S. energy security without global energy security."
  • "The United States must moderate the growing demand for energy by increasing efficiency of transportation, residential, commercial, and industrial uses."
  • "The world is not running out of energy resources, but there are accumulating risks to continuing expansion of oil and natural gas production from the conventional sources relied upon historically. These risks create significant challenges to meeting projected total energy demand."

 

 


It's a start. At least they admitted that there are serious supply challenges between now and 2030. The report also addressed the need for reducing demand, carbon capture and sequestration, and expanded production of renewables and other energy alternatives, as well as the demand-side challenges such as population growth and the red-hot economies of Asia.

It also mentions "The Peak Oil Debate," and for once, it represents the peaker case fairly accurately. The authors reviewed a range of global production forecasts, and noted that there was a significant gap between the ASPO forecast on the low side, the EIA reference case on the high side, and the forecasts of the international oil companies in between.

But like the IEA, the NPC seems to be bending over backwards in order to avoid saying "peak oil," by trying to couch it in terms of "accumulating risks" and "challenges" and parsing out the factors that are "conventional" or "above-ground."

 

The Peak By Any Other Name

Can we cut the crap?

When we reach the point where production stops increasing-as appears to be the case somewhere between last year and 2012-it's the peak. They can call it Ray, they can call it Jay, but it's still the peak.

Their belief that the many "challenges" can be overcome is based in the same old dogma, and is utterly unsupported by the facts on the ground. Factors pointing to an imminent peak, they say, "are countered by expectations for new discoveries, enhanced recovery techniques, advancing technology for producing oil from unconventional sources, and reassessments and revisions of known resources."

 

What's wrong with this picture?

Let's take their assertions point by point:

 

"expectations for new discoveries": The NPC forecasts that production will increase from 86 million barrels/day today to over 115 mmb/day by 2030. Based on all the numbers we have seen, that's simply not tenable, and even the EIA and IEA have said so.

 

The NPC production scenario for "known reserves" agrees with the ASPO model, as well as with the IEA forecast, with a peak around 2012. But after that, the NPC model takes a hard turn into fantasy land.

 

Worldwide discoveries have been on the decline for over 20 years. A sudden reversal of this trend to discover increasingly more oil ("exploration potential") after 2015 is pure fantasy. And as these oil industry experts know full well, it typically takes an average of seven years between discovery and first production of an oil field, so the fields that they expect to come online after the 2012 conventional peak should have already been discovered!

 

Like other forecasters, NPC expects that new supply will be provided mainly by the OPEC countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Where they diverge is in the scale: the NPC believes that those countries will actually double their exports. But exports from those countries have been decreasing in the last few years, as they struggle to maintain current production levels while their domestic consumption rises. The top 15 exporters in the world account for fully 84% of the total oil exported worldwide, and production in half of them is either flat or in decline. Very few industry analysts believe that a doubling of OPEC exports is even possible.

"enhanced recovery techniques": The historical experience of using enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques does not affect the date of the peak, nor the peak rate of production. It typically just extends the "tail" on the back end of the curve and increases the ultimately recoverable total. This graph seems to hugely misrepresent the role of EOR.

 

"advancing technology for producing oil from unconventional sources":  The sources they refer to are oil shale, tar sands and unconventional natural gas production. As I have written about previously, oil shale is so unlikely to ever be a major player that I have written it off entirely. Tar sands production might reach 5 mbpd by 2030, but then it won't be able to grow much more, and that would barely compensate for the decline of Canada's conventional oil production. And while unconventional natural gas certainly holds significant potential, by 2030 both natural gas and oil will be in such tight supply that it won't make any sense to think about one compensating for the other.

 

"reassessments and revisions of known resources":  As any peak oil student knows, this is a very sketchy area. The major revisions that have been made over the last thirty years appear to be more politically driven than anything, so all good models of oil peaking, like the ASPOs, rely on backdated reserve estimates which have proven themselves to be quite reliable. The honest revisions in the future are guaranteed to be marginal.

 

Remarking on the forecast that we'll get to 120 million barrels per day of production by 2030, Matthew Simmons, the world's top oil investment banker, said, "We don't have any idea where those reserves are going to come from or how we are going to get them out of the ground. The odds of this ever happening are zero."

 

 

 

The Real Gulf War

Meanwhile, last week, the IEA had its come-to-Jesus moment, admitting that a global supply shortfall in oil is looming dead ahead:

 

Despite four years of high oil prices, this report sees increasing market tightness beyond 2010...It is possible that the supply crunch could be deferred -- but not by much.

 

So the IEA (and the ASPO) see a supply crunch within three years, and yet the NPC sees smooth sailing for a full decade longer. It bears repeating: just three weeks ago, IEA chief economist Fatih Birol said in an interview with French newspaper Le Monde, "[I]f Iraqi production does not rise exponentially by 2015, we have a very big problem, even if Saudi Arabia fulfills all its promises. The numbers are very simple, there's no need to be an expert."

 

At this point, we can only speculate as to the reasons for the reality "gulf war" between the sober, 150-odd nonaligned energy analysts of the IEA, and the 175 members of the industry group NPC.

But it doesn't take a huge stretch of the imagination.

 

These Big Oil insiders all know what's up with peak oil. They're simply digging in their heels and denying it as long as possible in order to extract the highest possible value from their investments, plain and simple. We don't hire them to tell the simple truth, and they make no promises of it. "Ask me no questions and I'll tell you no lies" is their motto, and their obligations, as they are fond of telling us, are strictly to their shareholders.

 

The oil industry can no more wed itself to the truth than poor Romeo could his Juliet.

So by the time the NPC comes around to making its confession, they'll have one more sin to add to the list: deliberately misleading the nation into squandering precious time that we could have spent averting the pain and chaos that peak oil will bring.

 

Friday, July 13th, 2007

 

The IEA'S Come-to-Jesus Moment

By Chris Nelder

 

 

Q: What's the difference between an oil analyst and a used car salesman?

A: The used car salesman knows when he's lying.

That's a variation on the old joke about computer salesmen, but it can apply just as well to oil market analysts--such as the roughly 150 energy analysts and statisticians who work for the International Energy Association (IEA), the Paris-based agency that advises 26 OECD nations on energy.

On Monday this week, they had what I would consider a "come-to-Jesus moment," walking before the whole world to the front of the tent, admitting their unworthiness and publicly confessing their sins.

The confession was in their bombshell "Medium Term Oil Market Report," which looks at the global oil market over the next five years. And it was stark:

Despite four years of high oil prices, this report sees increasing market tightness beyond 2010 . . . It is possible that the supply crunch could be deferred--but not by much.

That was enough to set blogs and presses and email systems afire the world over. I was deluged with emails and phone calls about it. So I checked it out.

It's a decent piece of work, 82 pages with lots of good charts and data. It was also a welcome break from the delusional projections that the IEA has made for its entire 30-year existence, consistently predicting that supply will magically meet whatever the demand was projected to be.

Because for the first time, the IEA admitted that they have some doubts about oil supply keeping up with demand.

Their chart really says it all:

IEA Chart

Essentially, the report's conclusions boil down to this:

 

  1. Demand will rise at about the rate of 2.2% a year through 2012, primarily driven by the developing world's consumption, which is rising three times as fast as in the OECD. Transportation fuels will be the largest source of demand, by far.
  2. Non-OPEC production is expected to increase from 50 mbpd today to 52.5 mbpd by 2012, but the additional production will be mainly from unconventional sources such as natural gas liquids, tar sands production, extra heavy oil, coal-to-liquids, even biofuels.
  3. OPEC spare capacity will increase slightly from 2.5 mbpd in 2007 to a high of 3.4 mbpd in 2009, then decline to just 1.5 mbpd (1.6% of demand) by 2012. Almost all of it will have to come from Saudi Arabia.
  4. Depletion rates are worrisome: "Net oilfield decline rates average 4.6% annually for non-OPEC and 3.2% per year for OPEC crude. Aggregate levels mask much sharper declines in a 15-20% per annum range for mature producing areas and for many recent deepwater developments. All told, the forecast suggests the industry needs to generate 3.0 mb/d of new supply each year just to offset decline. Notwithstanding, above-ground supply risks are seen exceeding below-ground risks in the medium term."
  5. Rising project costs, shortages of labor and materials, and geopolitical problems will continue to plague world oil production, and conspire to create uncertainty and delay projects, so supply could fall short of demand by 2010. And shortages of natural gas are even more imminent.

 

 

The True Cost of a Barrel of Oil

For a real shocker see:

Life after the oil crash 

 

Future Shock: End of the Oil Age

 Watch The Show Here

In Future Shock: End of the Oil Age, RTÉ's Chief Economic Correspondent George Lee brings us to the heart of one of the biggest challenges that Ireland faces in the future - life after Peak Oil.

 

Peak Oil refers to a point in time when, with remaining reserves beginning to diminish, world oil production will reach its maximum point. The crossing of this simple threshold will be one of the biggest events in modern history: every day that passes after Peak Oil, there will be less oil available. The ensuing and inevitable rise in oil prices will be only the first of the continuing shocks for Ireland and the developed world.

In this, the second of RTÉ Television's Future Shock programmes, George Lee examines how close we are to the end of the oil age and how dramatically life may change in Ireland as the wells begin, finally, to dry up.

 

The Celtic Tiger thrived on a diet of cheap fuel. Indeed, the whole of Ireland's trading economy, from our labour supply to our civic structures, from our ever-expanding suburbs to our lifestyle and leisure patterns, are all based on cheap fuel and maximum mobility. Without this steady supply of cheap oil, many of the presumptions behind our very standard of living itself may require rapid re-evaluation.

After the oil crash, even Ireland's geographical position as an Atlantic island could become a defining, and isolating, factor in Ireland's future.

George Lee is Chief Economics Correspondent for RTÉ News and Current Affairs, reporting for both RTÉ Radio and RTÉ Television.

 

Friday, June 22nd, 2007

 

Canary in a Data Mine

By Chris Nelder

 

 

For the past week or so, I've been delving deeply into data on the world's oil production as part of some special side projects I will announce in the not-too-distant future.
 

What I have found has been, shall we say, less than encouraging. But crucially important information all the same.

So today, I'm going to attempt to summarize the big picture (as I see if) from a hard data perspective for a change.

 

Because this is an enormous topic for a short article, I'm going to summarize, and I won't spend much time justifying the assertions.  The full article can be seen here .

 

Demand

Worldwide demand is relentless, and has been increasing at an average rate of about 1.7% for the last ten years straight, or about 1.3 million barrels per day (mbpd) of new demand every year.

The IEA recently estimated that this year the world will need 1.7 million barrels a day more oil than it did last year, for a global oil demand of 86.1 million barrels a day.

"It seems difficult to escape the conclusion that the oil market will be tight in the second half [of the year]," the agency said in its June 2007 monthly oil market report.

 

The Peak

The most recent model by the Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO) puts the ultimately recoverable total of "all liquids" at 2,550 billion barrels, giving world production a peak date of 2011, with 1,102 billion barrels produced to date and 1,448 billion barrels to go. They reckon that the peak of "regular oil" was 2005.

 

My guess is that their guess is the best guess. I guess. (Trust me when I tell you that that's about as good as it gets in this sphere.)

Other estimates vary, but there is a fairly good locus of consensus around the 2009-2012 time frame among geologists and oil industry analysts (economists and government data-keepers tend to have much more optimistic predictions).

 

And it appears that the top ten oil producers--all mature oil provinces accounting for 62% of world production--have managed to eke out only a small increase from 2005 to 2006.

 

Suffice it to say, the peak is either already in the past or "soon enough," because the actions we need to take in response to peak are the same whether the peak is last year or four years hence.

For a closer look at the data, see the table at the end of this article.

 

Exports

Another way of looking at the production picture is exports, because what we in the U.S. really care about is not overall production, but the availability of the two thirds of our lifeblood which is imported.

A June 2007 study by Rembrandt Koppelaar of ASPO-Netherlands looked at just the global oil exports from 2002 to 2007. He concluded:

1)      "Total world exports of all fuel liquids have been on a plateau since the end of 2004, and declined slightly in the last year, despite production increases.

2)      "Liquids exports from non-OPEC countries as a whole have declined since the beginning of 2004.

3)      "OPEC liquids exports increased until the end of 2005, followed by a short plateau after which a slow decline set in, mainly due to declining production in Saudi Arabia."

 

So, while global liquids production increased by 1 mbpd from 2005 to 2006, the amount exported was flat. Koppelaar believes this is because as producer countries grow up and continue to industrialize, they consume more of their own production and are unable to increase exports.

Then where could those additional exports that we need so desperately come from?

 

OPEC in Control

Unfortunately, supply from all non-OPEC producers has been stagnant for about six years now, and current projections say that it will likely peak some time over the next three years, or perhaps even now.

That leaves OPEC as the last great hope.

But OPEC has declined: "OPEC notes oil markets remain well supplied and market fundamentals do not require any additional supply from the Organization at this time . . . A combination of current high inventory levels and increasing OPEC spare capacity, which is expected to reach around 15% in the second half of this year, means there are adequate supplies available to cope with any upward revisions to oil demand forecasts."

So there!

 

Unfortunately, ten of the eleven OPEC nations (pre-Angola) have been in decline since September 2005, to the tune of 2 million barrels per day of capacity.

Whether OPEC doesn't increase its exports because it can't--due to factors such as geological limits, security problems, lack of capacity, and increased domestic demand--or because it won't--because it's better for their long-term profitability--or all of the above, we cannot know. And they're certainly not telling.

 

But there is another possibly, elegantly argued by Dave Cohen in a recent article, "A paradigm shift." He suggests that what's really going on here is that OPEC producers (particularly Saudi Arabia) have realized that they are back in control of the world market, since non-OPEC is pumping flat-out, and that they really don't need to try to keep oil prices any lower than they are now.

They have also realized that they'll make far more profit by selling refined products than by selling crude, and they have approximately $350 billion worth of new projects in the works to increase both upstream (oil production) and downstream (making products from oil) capacity, reflecting their high confidence in its future.

 

But these additional investments, upstream or downstream, won't be coming online before next year, and some may take four years or more.

In the meantime, it looks like we're finally going to have to learn to live within our energy budgets, rather than assuming there will always be more when we need it.

So the upshot is this: There is clearly a yawning gap, possibly as much as a 2%, opening between production and demand in 2007 for those of us who depend on imports.

It looks to me like the loss of export capacity will prove to be the canary in the data mine. It doesn't really matter if the peak is technically a few years off if we can't satisfy our ever-growing thirst.

Until the world can build more complex refining capacity--such as the aforementioned investments in downstream capacity in the Middle East--we may expect gasoline prices to continue to rise along with the tightness of the light sweet crude market.

 

The days of $60 oil and $2.50 gasoline may be gone forever.

So that's my read of the situation right now. I openly express my gratitude to all the contributors at ASPO and The Oil Drum for their excellent analytical work. They're the best, and it's always a privilege to stand on their shoulders.

 

Buckle up, folks, $100 oil could be headed your way before the end of the summer.

Until next time,

 

Chris

chris sig

Comments (0)

You don't have permission to comment on this page.